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PRIVATE EQUITY’S OVERLEVERAGING OF
PORTFOLIO COMPANIES
Sophia Agathis*
ABSTRACT
With record-low interest rates, private equity has seen unparalleled
activity in recent years. Though thriving, private equity firms have
proved to be guilty of overleveraging their portfolio companies as
general partners. The results of overleveraging have been varied. At
one end, firms seem dedicated to a portfolio company’s
restructuring, investing further and pledging more capital in hopes of
future growth. At the other end, firms wishing to exit their
investment, redeem debt previously given to a portfolio company at
a premium and engage in a quick sale thereafter, leaving that
company unable to satisfy its future obligations. Firms that engage in
this behavior have exposed a hole in the legal framework of private
equity. This Note addresses the varied results of overleveraging and
advocates for enhanced fiduciary duties of the general partners and
expanding the duties of the indenture trustee for pre-default
behavior. These measures would prevent domestic firm general
partners from engaging in improper redemptions that would prevent
the portfolio company from paying its obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014 and 2015, over $1.2 trillion was invested in private equity,
the industry’s greatest mark since the financial crisis.1 The steady level
of near-zero percent interest rates in recent years has certainly helped
the industry. In the typical leveraged buyout, the private equity firm will
buy a public or private company using about 60% to 90% debt financing

1. Dan Primack, 2014 Was a Huge Year for M&A and Private Equity, FORTUNE,
(Jan. 5, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/05/2014-was-a-huge-year-forma-and-private-equity/ [http://perma.cc/43BD-8CEZ]; PE by the Numbers, AM. INV.
COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcouncil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/pe-by-th
e-numbers/ [http://perma.cc/34EP-3TV7] (last updated Mar. 2016).
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mainly provided by banks.2 With the cost of borrowing so low, private
equity managers have been able to expand their investing power,
resulting in steady investment in private equity while other sectors of the
economy have struggled.3
In the months following the U.S. financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve instituted its own set of crisis-related special programs, such as
the substantial purchase of long-term securities, which put pressure on
longer-term interest rates and eased overall financial conditions. 4
Consistently low interest rates set the stage for recovery over the past
seven years. 5 More specifically, these rates have had an impact in
private investment, and the private equity market, by spurning much
debate about taxing private equity and handling liability for the
underlying investments. 6 While most of the debate has centered on how
to tax private equity, this Note focuses on issues of liability for
underlying portfolio company debt obligations.
Private equity activity has seen its fair share of borderline predatory
overleveraging since the financial crisis. 7 However, this problem
remains unaddressed by Congress, federal agencies, and the states.8 On
2. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J.
ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2009, at 121, 124.
3. See PE by the Numbers, supra note 1.
4. The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Financial Crisis and Actions to Foster
Maximum Employment and Price Stability, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm [http://per
ma.cc/FMK7-JWHS] (last updated June 4, 2015).
5. Caroline Baum, This Economy Needs Ultra-Low Interest Rates Just to Stay
Afloat, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 25, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story
/this-economy-needs-ultra-low-interest-rates-just-to-stay-afloat-2015-11-25 [http://perm
a.cc/34W4-DP8R].
6. See generally William D. Cohan, Low Interest Rates Help Private-Equity
Moguls and Hurt Average Americans, THE NATION (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.thenati
on.com/article/low-interest-rates-help-private-equity-moguls-and-hurt-average-america
ns/ [http://perma.cc/9Z7Z-9Y5R].
7. See infra Part II.
8. See generally Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Five Years On: Regulation of
Private Fund Advisers After Dodd-Frank, Keynote Address at the Managed Fund
Association (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/white-regulation-ofprivate-fund-advisers-after-dodd-frank.html [http://perma.cc/Q448-98YH]; EILEEN
APPELBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE SEC
AFTER DODD-FRANK (2015), http://cepr.net/documents/pe-dodd-frank-2015-01.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C22Z-2M6X].
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multiple occasions, private equity giants have added struggling
companies to their portfolios; once in their possession, the firm
essentially strips down the company, issuing more debt than it can
handle and channeling the proceeds from the issuance to the general
partners. 9 The company is then left unable to pay interest on the
outstanding debt. Accordingly, with decreasing rates, the amount of
equity financing in leveraged buyouts, where funds typically borrow
outside money, has also steadily decreased as firms opt to secure
cheaper debt.10 The result of such an increase in debt financing has led
to more and more portfolio companies overleveraging and eventually
having to file for bankruptcy.11 This Note addresses the overleveraging
of portfolio companies, how the private equity fund structure allows for
it, and how to recover lost funds firms poach from these companies.
Part I discusses private equity funds and their limited partnership
structure, as well as the relevant tax and bankruptcy law provisions that
allow for debt financing. This section takes a look at the tax and liability
benefits of the limited partnership structure, and then it explains the
current policy debate regarding the treatment of private equity fund
income and other private equity tax issues. It concludes by looking at
two ways courts have ensured that private equity firms be held liable for
their portfolio company debts. Part II consists of two case studies:
Hellas Communications and Colt Defense, both of which were bought
up by private equity funds, overleveraged, and restructured. Hellas
Communications, a Greek telecommunications services provider, filed
for bankruptcy in 2007, and although the company recently emerged
from restructuring, it has remained the subject of multiple law suits in
different continents for many years. On the other hand, Colt Defense, a
nearly 200-year-old American weapon manufacturer, entered
reorganization in the summer of 2015 and emerged healthy from
bankruptcy in 2016. This section ends by addressing the current market
trends of exit strategies and the role that debt financing has played in
influencing certain strategies. Part III advocates for a solution in which
9. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 126–27 (2013).
10. PE by the Numbers, supra note 1.
11. Arleen Jacobius, Private Equity Fund Restructurings on the Rise, Survey Says,
PENSIONS & INVS. (June 7, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150607/
ONLINE/150609891/private-equity-fund-restructurings-on-the-rise-survey-says [http://
perma.cc/H4GC-LVTS].
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sophisticated contracting parties take it upon themselves to ensure they
do not suffer a windfall.
I. PRIVATE EQUITY FUND STRUCTURE AND LAWS
A. REFRESHER ON THE STRUCTURE OF FUNDS & THEIR TAX BENEFITS
1. Fund Structure: Limited Partnership as a Liability Shield
Most domestic private equity funds are organized as limited
partnerships, usually in Delaware, and as such contain at least one
general partner and at least one limited partner.12 The private equity fund
itself is “a pool of capital with no operations.”13 In its simplest form, the
firm managing the fund acts as the general partner, while the investors
act as the limited partners.14 The general partner (unless expressly set in
the partnership agreement) has unlimited liability and assumes the debts
and obligations of the funds, which is therefore usually organized as a
limited liability entity (either an LP or LLC). 15 Within this structure, the
members or managers of the limited liability entity are typically
members or managers of the firm itself.16 On the other hand, the limited
partners—sophisticated and institutional investors—enjoy the benefits
of limited liability, and are only liable for the amount of their capital
12. JAMES M. SCHELL ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS § 3.01 (2016). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to 17-1111
(2016). For a graphical representation of this structure, see Mariya Stefanova, Private
Equity Structures and Their Impact on Private Equity Accounting and Reporting, FIN.
TIMES PRESS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2316387
&seqNum=2 [http://perma.cc/63F8-BUM4].
13. Scott W. Naidech, Private Equity Fund Formation, PRAC. L. CO. (2011),
http://www.msaworldwide.com/Naidech_PrivateEquityFundFormation_Nov11.pdf [htt
p://perma.cc/M2AM-5FPN].
14. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns,
Persistence, and Capital Flows, 60 J. FINANCE 1791, 1793 (2005); Amanda N. Persaud
& Adrienne Atkinson, Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of the Structural, ERISA,
Securities and Other Regulatory Issues, in INVESTMENT ADVISOR REGULATION: A STEPBY-STEP GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW § 47:1 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3d ed.
2012).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403(b); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 2.
16. John J. McDonald, Actions that Private Equity Fund Representatives on
Portfolio Company Boards Can Take to Help Avoid Liability, J. PRIV. EQUITY, Fall
2008, at 1.
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contribution.17 An investment advisor, usually affiliated with the private
equity firm (the general partner), provides investment management
services to the fund. The investment advisor employs “investment
professionals, evaluates potential investment opportunities and incurs
the expenses associated with day-to-day operations and administration
of the fund.”18 When the general partner decides to acquire a company
through a leveraged buyout, the firm will put some of its own capital
into the fund, and the fund will acquire debt financing from a bank to
buy up the target company’s shares or buy out the firm’s owners.19 After
such financing, the fund itself will own the company, and the general
partner can carry out its target strategy to create value.20
Another advantage of the limited partnership structure is that when
the fund seeks debt financing through the fund itself, the firm is able to
sever liability for any future default by the fund. The debt liabilities
become those of the portfolio companies, by virtue of its ownership by
the fund and the structure of the general partner as a limited liability
company, enjoying pass-through taxation and a liability shield from the
fund’s debts exceeding the general partner’s committed capital.21
As evidenced, limited partnerships favor broad freedom to contract,
and this also applies to general partner fiduciary duties with respect to
the partnership. 22 The Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act
provides that a partner’s fiduciary duties may be expanded, restricted, or
altogether eliminated by contract, with the exception of the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.23 The Delaware courts have upheld the LP
17.
18.
19.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303.
Naidech, supra note 13.
Mark Koba, Private Equity: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2013, 2:50 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100405662 [http://perma.cc/P8FB-SQAW].
20. See id.
21. SCHELL ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.01[3].
22. Srinivas M. Raju & Jillian G. Remming, Fiduciary Duties in the Alternative
Entity Context, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 16, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/c
ommittees/commercial/articles/summer2012-0812-fiduciary-duties-alternative-entity.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/YDS9-SYBM].
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2016) (“To the extent that, at law or in
equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited
partnership or to another partner . . . the partner’s or other person’s duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement;
provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). It is also important to note, as many private
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and LLC’s freedom to eliminate fiduciary duties, including those
available at common law.24
2. Debt Financing as a Tax Deductible Expense
Private equity debt financing is tax efficient because of the taxdeductible investment interest expense. Section 163 of the Internal
Revenue Code allows for a tax deduction for the interest that accrues on
debt.25 When the fund receives cash in exchange for bonds, agreeing to
make fixed payments in the future to the bondholder, the fund may
deduct the fixed payments.26 These reduced taxes are valuable to firms,
and can account for anywhere between 4% and 40% of a firm’s value.27
The more a fund leverages, the greater the tax advantage, and with the
cost of debt so low, this has proved enticing for fund managers.28
In 2013, three agencies came together to issue guidance to banks
about leveraged lending.29 In the release, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency discouraged leveraging
greater than six times a company’s EBITDA (earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization).30 Later on that year, the agencies
sent letters to about a dozen large lenders, urging them to comply with
the guidance. 31 In response, Bank of America, Citigroup, and J.P.
equity funds are formed as LLCs, that the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act has
an almost identical provision. See id. § 18-1101(c); see also Raju & Remming, supra
note 22.
24. See, e.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1025 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(holding that an LP agreement eliminated the common law duty to disclose in addition
to all other fiduciary duties).
25. I.R.C. § 163 (2012).
26. See id.
27. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 2, at 15; see Steven Davidoff Solomon, For
Companies, Tax Code Adds to Debt’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2012,
6:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/for-corporations-u-s-tax-code-addsto-debts-appeal/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7QXG-6CSE].
28. Felix Barber & Michael Gould, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept. 2007, at 53.
29. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17,766 (Mar. 22,
2013).
30. Id. at 17,773.
31. Gillian Tan, Banks Sit Out Riskier Deals, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 8:07
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230430270457933482020153001
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Morgan, among others, decided against financing some corporate
takeovers.32 In 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s
senior deputy comptroller identified private equity as the target of the
guidance, as well as a cause of “bad practices” that the agencies were
trying to mitigate.33
In recent years, firms have taken advantage of the tax-deductible
expense and reaped the benefits of low borrowing rates. With rates on
leveraged loans falling to 5.4% in 2014, albeit with a slight raise in
2015, private equity saw extremely busy years in 2014 and 2015. 34
Private equity fundraising hit $555 billion and $527 billion in 2014 and
2015, respectively, with just under 50% coming from buyouts.35
In addition to the favorable treatment of the general partner’s gains,
the partnership structure allows for the pass-through of losses to equity
owners, such as the limited partners, but is limited by section 67 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 36 Moreover, where limited partners are taxexempt organizations, such as retirement plans, there will be no taxation
at the limited partner level. However, this is conditioned on the fund not
treating the investments producing the gains as debt-financed, and is
therefore inapplicable to the subject of this Note.37
3. Carried Interest
The limited partnership structure also provides various tax benefits,
some of which have spurned recent debate. First off, limited
0 [http://perma.cc/UB5C-Y35T].
32. Id.
33. Id. (“The impact on private equity, a significant driver of what we see as risky
practices, is an intended consequence of our actions . . . . As regulators, we certainly
hope to change bad practices and remove the extraordinary froth that’s experienced at
the peak of a credit cycle. If we can mitigate that, it reduces the size of the valley to
follow.”).
34. BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, http://www.bain.com/bai
nweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf [http://perm
a.cc/9Q2H-XRR6]; see also BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, at 25,
26 fig.2.2, http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_E
quity_Report_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/LSM9-UXYG].
35. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, supra note 34, at 2 &
fig.1.2.
36. Persaud & Atkinson, supra note 14, § 47:3.1[A][5].
37. Id. § 47:3.1[A][2].
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partnerships permit a “pass-through” structure for purposes of U.S.
federal income tax, meaning there is no federal income tax at the entity
level on either capital gains or other income.38 However, that income
from the sale of portfolio investments is subject to taxation when it is
funneled to the general partner and limited partners. 39 If the fund’s
partners are individuals and the investment had been held for more than
one year, the gains are taxed once at preferential long-term capital gains
rates.40 This characteristic of the private equity fund structure has raised
much political debate over the past fifteen years, with many believing
these profits, or carried interest, should be treated as ordinary income,
rather than capital gains.41
If income generated from ownership interests in partnership funds
was treated as ordinary income rather than capital gains, it would likely
be subject to a 35% tax rate—the maximum rate on ordinary income and
short term capital gains—rather than its current 20% rate. 42 Congress
and other politicians have spent a great deal of time arguing about this
loophole.43 On one side of the debate, some believe that this is clearly
ordinary income, compensating the fund managers for their services in
managing companies and selling them off at a profit, and thus should be
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 47:3.1[A][1].
Id.
Id.
Ryan Ellis, Taxing Carried Interest Capital Gains as Ordinary Income is a
Very Bad Idea, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis
/2015/09/04/taxing-carried-interest-capital-gains-as-ordinary-income-is-a-very-badidea/ [http://perma.cc/YN3P-HXJ4].
42. This income was previously taxed at the prior rate for capital gains of 15%. See
Steven D. Bortnick, Basics of Private Equity Taxation, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Jan.
17, 2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/resource/2137/4H1 [http://perma.cc/5LNCA944]; Dean Baker & Grover Norquist, Kill the Private-Equity Tax Break, BUSINESS
WEEK (Aug. 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2007/07/kill_t
he_privat.html [http://perma.cc/WPA9-LHFS]. Although the current rate is now at
20%, the argument in favor of applying the ordinary income rate to income generated
from ownership interests in partnership funds still stands. See Eileen Appelbaum,
Private Equity Tax Breaks: How Long Will They Last?, FORTUNE (Apr. 10, 2014, 6:05
PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/10/private-equity-tax-breaks-how-long-will-they-last/
[http://perma.cc/KE5H-BD2Q].
43. See, e.g., American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213,
111th Cong.; Job Creation and Tax Cuts Act of 2010, S. 3793, 111th Cong. At this
time, there has been no legislative action to address the tax treatment of carried
interests.
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taxed as such.44 On the other hand, some argue that this compensation
for managers is not a salary because of the risk incurred in their
investment, and that labor, at times, may receive capital-gains
treatment.45 However, Congress has yet to pass any laws changing the
taxation of profits from private equity activities.46
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUND LIABILITY FOR PORTFOLIO DEBTS
1. Federal Fraudulent Transfer Law, State Fraudulent Transfer Law,
and Unjust Enrichment Claims
The Bankruptcy Code grants an estate in bankruptcy certain
avoidance powers for preferential and fraudulent transfers under
sections 547 and 548 47 to protect companies and their creditors from
certain transactions. 48 Section 547 allows a trustee to avoid as a
preferential transfer
any transfer made by an insolvent debtor in the ninety days
preceding bankruptcy, where the transfer (i) was made to or for the
benefit of a creditor; (ii) was made for or on account of an
antecedent debt owed by the debtor; and (iii) enabled the creditor to
receive more than it otherwise would have under the provisions of
49
the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 548 provides that
a trustee of a bankruptcy estate may avoid as a constructively
fraudulent transfer any transfer or obligation incurred by a debtor
within the two years before the date of the filing of the petition when

44. Should Carried Interest Be Taxed as Ordinary Income, Not as Capital Gains?,
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113
04577370062392150338?mg=id-wsj [http://perma.cc/QB87-7UUK].
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (2012).
48. John Ames et al., Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy
Code: A Primer in Pain, in THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE
2008/2009, at 107 (2008).
49. Lehman Bros. Holdings v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 469 B.R. 415, 435
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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made in exchange for “less than reasonably equivalent value” and
50
that left the debtor insolvent.

In 1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to include an
exemption from fraudulent transfer avoidance—section 546(e)—for
margin payments or settlement payments made between “financial
participant[s]” in connection with a securities contract that lacked an
actual intent to defraud.51
In recent years, the law of fraudulent and preferential transfers has
been expanded into the private equity context, specifically to overturn
certain leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”). 52 During the recession in the
United States, highly leveraged portfolio companies proved unable to
stay afloat during the economy’s downward spiral, and in turn led
creditors and debtors to seek to recover payments made to the
companies’ selling shareholders as part of the LBO. 53 Private equity
firms open themselves to this fraudulent transfer litigation where they
overvalue a target company and render that company insolvent by
loading on new debt.54 In these situations, the firm exposes not only the
acquired company, but also its new investors. 55 Both the Second and
Third Circuits have extended the availability of section 546(e)’s

50.
51.

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 546(e); see Samir D. Parikh, Saving Fraudulent Transfer Law, 86
AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 335 (2012).
52. See Grant Vingoe, Michael Bernstein & Stewart Aaron, Arnold & Porter LLP,
Financial Markets Regulatory Roundtable: The Use of Fraudulent Conveyance
Principles to Overturn LBOs (June 6, 2012), http://files.arnoldporter.com/nyrrprinciples%20to%20overturn%20lbos%20-%20june%206%202012.pdf [http://perma.c
c/Y3G6-A3YC].
53. Ilkka Perheentupa & Jonathan L. Sagot, Private Equity Alert: Caveat Vendor –
Mitigating Fraudulent Conveyance Risk, WEIL GOTSHAL, at 1 (May 2010),
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/private_equity_alert_may_14_2009.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2PAW-UQHR]. To protect against this type of fraudulent transfer claim,
selling sponsors can attempt to frame these transactions as “settlement payments”
within the scope of Section 546(e). Id. at 2.
54. Nicholas F. Kajon, Dividend Recaps: Why Some of Today’s Private Equity
Deals May Become Tomorrow’s Fraudulent Conveyances, STEVENS & LEE (Jan. 20,
2007), http://www.stevenslee.com/dividend-recaps-why-some-of-todays-private-equitydeals-may-become-tomorrows-fraudulent-conveyances/ [http://perma.cc/J23P-QX27].
55. Id.
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exception for settlement payments, 56 while the Eleventh Circuit has
declined to apply the safe harbor where the financial institution does not
“acquire[] a beneficial interest in either the [transferred] funds or
securities.57
As an alternative to proceeding under section 548, states also have
their own fraudulent transfers statutes.58 The benefit of these statutes is
typically a longer claw-back period from which to recover transfers,
while the major downfall is their requirement for an actual unsecured
creditor with standing to bring the complaint.59
In suits where plaintiff creditors bring fraudulent transfer claims, a
plaintiff may also bring an unjust enrichment claim. 60 For example,
under New York law, an unjust enrichment claim is unavailable where it
“duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contact or tort claim,” but such a
claim will not be dismissed on the basis that they are “duplicative of
fraudulent transfers claims.” 61 Despite the availability of an unjust
enrichment claim, this remedy for defrauded creditors is relatively new
and courts have only recently started to uphold such claims.62

56. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v.
Am. United Life Ins. Co. (In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc.), 719 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.
2013); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516
(3d Cir. 1999).
57. See Munford v. Valuation Res. Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610
(11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). For a complete discussion regarding the application of
section 546(e), see Parikh, supra note 51, at 337–48.
58. See Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers, VEDDER PRICE, at 4 (2002),
http://www.vedderprice.com/files/Publication/91c17fac-ae6a-4a05-a16418c97905ee09/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7710c995-93cd-43b0-b62e-5183411bb6fd/Avoidin
g%20Fraudulent%20Transfers.pdf [http://perma.cc/LF4P-NE3C].
59. See id.
60. Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA)
(Hosking II), 535 B.R. 543, 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Corsello v. Verizon
N.Y., Inc., 967 N.E.2d 1177, 1185 (N.Y. 2012)).
61. Id.
62. Compare Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 883 N.E.2d 990, 996 (N.Y. 2008)
(upholding an unjust enrichment claim’s dismissal where there was “an adequate
remedy at law”), with Hosking II, 535 B.R. at 585 (upholding an unjust enrichment
claim where it is “validly pleaded in the alternative” to other claims).
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2. Sun Capital: Introducing Fund Liability for Portfolio Company
Obligations
In Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, the First Circuit introduced the
precedent that firms can and should be liable for certain obligations of
their portfolio companies under a specific set of circumstances. 63 In
2007, two funds of Sun Capital Advisors, Inc.,64 Sun Fund III and Sun
Fund IV, acquired complete ownership in Scott Brass, Inc. (“SBI”), a
Rhode Island corporation, which participated in a New England based
multiemployer pension plan. 65 In 2008, SBI experienced declining
copper prices, which reduced the value of its inventory and caused it to
breach its loan covenants and lose its access to credit.66 As a result, it
stopped contributing to the pension plan, and therefore became liable for
its proportionate share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits pursuant to
section 4201 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”).67 This triggered over $4.5 million in withdrawal liability.68
However, in November 2008, SBI became the subject of an involuntary
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 69 As a result, the pension plan
demanded that the two funds owning SBI pay the full amount of
withdrawal liability, claiming that the funds “entered into a partnership
or joint venture in common control with SBI and were therefore jointly
and severally liable for SBI’s withdrawal liability.”70
In 2010, the funds filed an action in federal court seeking a
declaration that they were not subject to liability under the two-part
statutory test required by ERISA.71 The test provides that in order “to
63. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus.
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 139–44 (1st Cir. 2013).
64. Sun Capital Partners, Inc. is global private equity firm with over $9.1 billion of
capital under management. About Us, SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC., http://www.suncap
part.com/?page_id=10 [http://perma.cc/GXD4-6XKT].
65. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 135–36.
66. Id. at 136.
67. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 4201, 29 U.S.C. §
1381 (2012).
68. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 136.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 137; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
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impose withdrawal liability on an organization other than the one
obligated to the [pension plan], two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the
organization must be under common control with the obligated
organization, and 2) the organization must be a trade or business.”72 The
district court agreed with the pension plan, basing its decision wholly on
the second part of this test. 73 On appeal, the First Circuit applied an
“investment plus” approach to evaluate the “trade or business” prong in
determining whether the funds were more than mere passive investors.74
After a lengthy discussion, the court held that Sun Fund IV met the
“trade or business” prong.75 The First Circuit remanded the decision to
the district court to determine the status of Sun Fund III and to
determine the issue of common control for both funds.76
While the decision in Sun Capital turned on liability under a
statutory test required by ERISA, the court engaged in two important
discussions regarding general fund liability for portfolio company
obligations. In the first one, the court addressed the underlying issue in
the carried interest debate—namely, that because of the fees granted to
the general partners of funds and the nature of their involvement in the
funds, they are carrying out a business and should be treated as such
under the law. 77 In the second discussion, the court introduced an
important point about the role of the general partner to break the liability
shield for the partners under Delaware law.78 The court stated:
Here, the limited partnership agreements gave the Sun Funds’
general partners the exclusive authority to act on behalf of the
limited partnerships to effectuate their purposes. These purposes
included managing and supervising investments in portfolio
companies, as well as “other such activity incidental or ancillary
thereto” as deemed advisable by the general partner. So, under
Delaware law, it is clear that the general partner of Sun Fund IV, in

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 138.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 148-49.
The court stated that in order to be considered an employer under ERISA both
prongs of the test must be met. Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 146–47.
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providing management services to SBI, was acting as an agent of the
79
Fund.

Although the scope of the court’s decision was limited to the
specific issue of whether the funds could be held liable under ERISA,
Sun Capital raised an important issue in fund liability for portfolio
companies that courts will likely face more frequently as private equity
continues to grow.
II. THE VARYING RESULTS OF OVERLEVERAGING: HELLAS
COMMUNICATIONS, COLT DEFENSE, & MARKET TRENDS IN EXITS
This part provides examples of the varying results that occur when
funds overleverage their portfolio companies. Part II.A examines Hellas
Communications. Although the company emerged from bankruptcy and
is currently operational, it remains the subject of various lawsuits in the
United States and abroad because of redemptions made by its private
equity owners prior to the company’s sale. 80 Part II.B examines Colt
Defense, which filed for bankruptcy in June of 2015 and successfully
reorganized in January 2016.81 Part II.C demonstrates other effects of
overleveraging through market research; namely, how overleveraging in
private equity has affected the exit strategies used by firms.82
A. HELLAS COMMUNICATIONS: A FOREIGN COMPANY WITH DOMESTIC
APPLICATIONS
1. About Hellas Communications
Hellas Communications is one of the largest and most innovative
telecommunications companies in Greece.83 The company was founded
in Greece in 1992 and began providing mobile telecommunications
services in the Greek market in 1993.84 In 1997, the company was the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 147.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
The company is now known as WIND Hellas Telecommunications S.A.
Company Profile, WIND, http://www.wind.gr/en/wind/gia-tin-etaireia/etairiko-profil/
[http://perma.cc/E2RG-5DZZ].
84. Id.
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first to launch prepaid phone service in Greece, and in 2003, it made the
first 3G call in Greece. 85 By the end of 2004, the company had 2.3
million customers, reported sales of €840 million, and an operating
income of approximately €121 million.86
In April 2005, Telecom Italia sold its ownership in Hellas
Communications to two large global private equity firms, London’s
Apax Partners (“Apax”) and Texas Pacific Group (“TPG”), for €1.6
billion (about a 17% premium above share price).87 This was the largest
leveraged buyout Greece had ever seen, 88 financed mostly through
borrowed funds from JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank.89 Apax and TPG
set up multiple entities under Luxembourg law in preparation for the
acquisition, including “Hellas,” “Hellas I,” and “Hellas II.”90 The firms
acquired an 80% majority stake in the company through eight
investment funds and obtained financing through these entities.91 Hellas
II was the direct owner of Hellas Communications, but Apax and TPG
used other investment funds to issue debt and redeem its equity stake, as
described below.92

85.
86.

Id.
Press Release, Apax Partners, Apax Partners’ Funds and Texas Pacific Group
to Acquire Control of Tim Hellas Telecommunications S.A. in a 1.1 Billion Euro
Transaction (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.apax.com/news/apax-news/2005/april/apaxpartners%E2%80%99-funds-and-texas-pacific-group-to-acquire-control-of-tim-hellastelecommunications-sa-in-a-11-billion-euro-transaction/ [http://perma.cc/XR7L-BJZ7].
87. Id.
88. Another Greek Tragedy, THE ECONOMIST (June 20, 2015), http://www.economi
st.com/news/finance-and-economics/21654680-pressure-mounts-two-private-equity-gia
nts-did-very-well-out-disastrous [http://perma.cc/J5UJ-59GS].
89. Press Release, Apax Partners, supra note 86.
90. See Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II
SCA) (Hosking I), 524 B.R. 488, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also infra fig.1.
91. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497; see also infra fig.1.
92. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497; see also infra fig.1 (showing that Hellas II is
the direct owner of TIM Hellas Communications S.A.).
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Figure 1: Glimpse at Hellas Communications Ownership
Structure93
Upon taking a majority equity position in the company, the firms
began issuing debt and cancelled their equity interests in the portfolio
company.94 The firms then used Hellas II and other entities to acquire
another portfolio company, Q-Telecom, a business unit of a large mobile
network operator in Greece.95 This highly leveraged acquisition closed
in January 2006. 96 The debt was primarily issued by Hellas II. 97 The

93. Ownership structure is derived from the facts of the case and does not include
other Hellas entities not pertinent to the discussion. See Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 497.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 497-98.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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firms then began loading up the funds with debt.98 By December 2006,
Apax and TPG redeemed just shy of €1 billion from debt issuances by
Hellas I (€973.7 million). 99 This included a redemption of
“Luxembourgish instrument[s]” called convertible preferred equity
certificates (“CPECs”) at 35 times their par value.100 In February 2007,
Apax and TPG sold Hellas and its subsidiaries to the Italian corporation
Weather Investments S.p.A., later renamed WIND Telecom S.p.A. 101
The sale went for €500 million of equity and €2.9 billion of net debt.102
At this point, Hellas II’s financial statements reflected that its debt
obligations had resulted in a loss of more than €259.5 million, and the
company was leveraged at 12.4 times EBIT (earnings before interest and
tax).103 By 2009, Hellas II went into administration in the UK.104
2. Proceedings
As early as 2012, the liquidators that were appointed to Hellas II
filed lawsuits against Apax and TPG based on debt issued in 2006.105
98. The specifics of these transactions are described in depth in the court’s
decision. Id. at 497–99.
99. Id. at 498; see Gretchen Morgenson, Judge’s Ruling Offers Peek into Private
Equity’s Secret World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/0
6/business/judges-ruling-offers-peek-into-private-equitys-secret-world.html?_r=0 [http:
//perma.cc/6976-5EW3].
100. Another Greek Tragedy supra note 88.
101. Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 498.
102. Press Release, Apax Partners, Funds Advised by Apax Partners and TPG
Announce the Sale of TIM Hellas to Weather Investments (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://www.apax.com/news/apax-news/2007/february/funds-advised-by-apax-partnersand-tpg-announce-the-sale-of-tim-hellas-to-weather-investments/ [http://perma.cc/Z2Y
M-U5CE].
103. Hosking I, 524 B.R. at 498.
104. Helia Ebrahimi, Wind Hellas To Be UK’s Biggest Pre-Pack Administration,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediate
chnologyandtelecoms/telecoms/6556553/Wind-Hellas-to-be-UKs-biggest-pre-pack-ad
ministration.html [http://perma.cc/HGC2-E4JF]. Administration in the UK is similar to
a chapter 11 proceeding in the United States. Both are designed to rehabilitate the
company in question and “prevent the creditors’ race for assets by imposing a
moratorium against individual creditor actions.” Jodie A. Kirshner, Design Flaws in the
Bankruptcy Regime: Lessons from the U.K. for Preventing a Resurgent Creditors’ Race
in the U.S., 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 527, 534 (2015).
105. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
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The suits include: Luxembourg Commercial Court claims, 106 U.S.
bankruptcy court proceedings,107 New York federal court proceedings in
the Southern District,108 and a New York state court judgment.109
In September 2014, the New York Supreme Court granted
summary judgment for certain holders of Hellas Communications debt
securities (via the indenture trustee—Wilmington Trust Co. (“WTC”)—
and Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp., an assignee for collection).110 The
court granted the judgment for recovery of principal and interest under
the indenture despite dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims for the
plaintiffs’ lack of standing. 111 However, this judgment remained
outstanding as of March 2016, as the named Hellas entities had gone
completely bankrupt.112
In December 2014, WTC received U.S. District Judge J. Paul
Oetken’s permission to pursue more entities tied to Hellas
Communications for unpaid debt, which WTC asserts can be traced
back to the private equity giants who stripped Hellas.113 Although Judge
Oetken initially dismissed the case in March 2014 due to lack of
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, he agreed to
reopen the case and allow an amended complaint that dropped certain
foreign parties.114 These parties, which included Apax subsidiaries, filed
106. See Corporate Finance & Insolvency Litigation – Hellas Case: Court Rejects
Claim, KLEYR GRASSO (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.kleyrgrasso.com/scpt_news/hellascase/ [http://perma.cc/E9SV-AUGK]. The Luxembourg Commercial Court rejected all
claims by the Hellas liquidators, asserting that (1) the redemption of the CPECs, the
instruments in question, “could not be requalified as illegal dividend distributions to the
shareholders” as they were debt instruments, and (2) the repurchase price of the CPECs
were not fraudulent, but rather were independently verified to the approval of the
Luxembourg Court back in 2006. See id.
107. See, e.g., Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.)
II SCA) (Hosking II), 535 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
108. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Aliberti, No. 12-CV-8686 (JPO), 2014 WL
6907548 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014).
109. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.á.r.l, 996 N.Y.S.2d 476
(Sup. Ct. 2014).
110. Id. at 498.
111. Id.
112. Jeff Zalesin, Hellas Noteholders OK’d for New $565M Complaint in PE Row,
LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/723100/hellas-noteholdersok-d-for-new-565m-complaint-in-pe-row [http://perma.cc/9Q7A-XQDG].
113. Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548, at *3; Zalesin, supra note 112.
114. Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548, at *1; Zalesin, supra note 112.
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a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting the case
belongs in Europe where many claims have already been dismissed, but
as of this writing there has been no decision on the issue.115
In the U.S. bankruptcy court proceedings, the plaintiffs assert that
the company did not have sufficient earnings to cover the various
payouts to Apax and TPG’s subsidiaries, and, accordingly, such
payments should be clawed back as a fraudulent transfer.116 Meanwhile,
Apax and TPG claim that the company was in perfectly good health
when it was sold in 2007, and the reason the plaintiffs’ debt instruments
defaulted was solely a result of the financial crisis.117 In the press release
regarding the sale, the funds even stated, “During Apax’s and TPG’s
period of ownership, the company was successfully turned round and set
on a growth trajectory leading to a significant improvement in all
financial and operating key metrics.”118 Despite Apax and TPG’s best
efforts, in early 2015, Judge Martin Glenn granted in part and denied in
part four motions to dismiss the complaint in the bankruptcy court
proceedings. 119 In August of the same year, Judge Glenn granted the
liquidators a motion to amend their complaint to add new defendants
and assert new claims against the proposed defendants and the original
defendants, and to withdraw certain other claims and other defendants
from the proceedings.120

115. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
Aliberti, 2014 WL 6907548 (No. 12-CV-8686 (JPO)); Jenna Ebersole, Cos. Want PE
Row Over $565M Judgment Tossed, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.law360.com/
articles/749547/cos-want-pe-row-over-565m-judgment-tossed [http://perma.cc/2G5E-J
SPD]; William Louch, Luxembourg Court Rules in Favour of Apax, TPG in Hellas
Case, FIN. NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2015-1224/hellas-ii-apax-tpg-luxembourg-ruling [http://perma.cc/4UE9-A8MX].
116. Morgenson, supra note 99.
117. Id.
118. Press Release, Apax Partners, supra note 102.
119. The complaint was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Apax and
foreign-based entities affiliated with Apax and TPG. The court also dismissed
fraudulent transfer claims for lack of standing. However, the court concluded that
personal jurisdiction could be exercised over each of the United States-based
defendants. Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II
SCA) (Hosking I), 524 B.R. 488, 536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Hosking v. TPG
Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA) (Hosking II), 535 B.R.
543, 551 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining the procedural background of Hosking I).
120. Hosking II, 535 B.R. at 595-96.
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3. Analysis: A Precedent Set for the Industry
According to emails cited by Judge Glenn in his bankruptcy court
decision to uphold complaints against Hellas, certain employees within
TPG were aware of the damage to be done to Hellas II upon the
execution of the 2006 debt issuances. 121 One email from a TPG
executive to an employee at Apax stated that they would be “putting the
business under huge pressure,” while another warned of the dangerous
position Hellas II would find itself in should the redemption occur.122 In
addition, there were various inconsistencies in the 2006 debt offerings,
such as the prospectus’ description of the issuance as a repayment of
“deeply subordinated shareholder loans,” when there were no
shareholder loans listed on the company’s balance sheet.123 Thus, it is
likely that the case of Hellas II did not just involve a typical
overleveraging of a portfolio company, but also fraudulent practices.
The situation highlights the extreme practices that the private equity
fund structure will allow.
While the parallel case in Luxembourg determined whether the
payout was a breach of the country’s corporate laws,124 the New York
trials still will be important for fund managers. The outcome could
prove useful in deterring them from this type of extreme overleveraging,
in which firms extract funds from a company for a large, short-term
payoff, leaving creditors with an empty promise of debt that is unable to
be repaid.125 Before Apax and TPG purchased the company, at the year
ended December 31, 2004, Hellas Communications had a debt to equity
ratio of 1.09 (in thousands of euro, 709,672 total liabilities/650,019

121.
122.
123.

Id. at 579-81.
Id.
Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity’s Trojan Horse of Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14gret.html [http://perm
a.cc/2RYP-DX9K].
124. Louch, supra note 115; see also Morgenson, supra note 99.
125. Had Hellas II been a domestic fund, such as a Delaware LP, with direct onshore investors, the court would also address the issue of whether the leveraged
recapitalization was a fraudulent transaction under U.S. bankruptcy law. See Eva Davis
& Hamed Meshki, Trends in Private Equity Exits, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Sept. 2010),
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ARTICLE%20PDF%20-%20PRINTIN
G%20ALLOWED%20-%20PLC%20-%20E%20Davis.pdf [http://perma.cc/BD9Z-4RF
P].
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Shareholders equity). 126 At the year ended December 31, 2006,
immediately prior to the sale by Apax and TPG, but following Hellas
II’s debt issuance to the firms, Hellas Communications found itself with
a debt to equity ratio of 68.1 (in thousands of euro, 1,988,267 total
liabilities/29,208 total equity). 127 That leverage ratio increased the
following year after the sale of Hellas Communications. 128 After the
departure of Apax and TPG, the company went through a very complex,
global restructuring in 2010, with its bondholders taking 100% of the
company’s shares in return for waiving a €1.225 billion debt
obligation.129
B. COLT DEFENSE: A SUCCESSFUL INVESTMENT, DESPITE LEVERAGE AND
DEFAULT
Colt’s Manufacturing Company is “one of the world’s oldest most
renowned designers, developers and manufacturers of firearms.”130 The
company traces its roots back to 1836, when the company’s founder,
Sam Colt, opened his first factory in Paterson, NJ, where he developed
and produced the pocket, belt, and holster model pistols along with two
types of rifles.131 By 1847, Colt received his first government order from
the U.S. Ordnance Department for one thousand of his pistols. 132 In
1851, Colt became the first American manufacturer to open a plant in
England, incorporating under the name of Colt’s Patent Fire Arms
Manufacturing Company. 133 The company has been manufacturing
firearms since its inception, arming American officers in both World
126.
127.
128.
129.

TIM HELLAS TELECOMMS. S.A., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 16 (2004).
TIM HELLAS TELECOMMS. S.A., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at F-49 to F-50 (2006).
Id.
Anousha Sakoui, Wind Hellas Secures Debt Revamp, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1a77f54c-dab6-11df-81b0-00144feabdc0.html#a
xzz3t9Iupy88 [http://perma.cc/N63P-PNUG]. See generally Colin Chang et al., WIND
Hellas: A Complex Restructuring in a Global Recession, WHITE & CASE LLP (Feb. 24,
2011), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/artic
le_wind_hellas_complex_restructuring.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BSK-ZZCT] (providing
an in-depth look at the restructuring).
130. Colt Defense LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 20, 2014).
131. History, COLT, http://www.colt.com/Company/History [http://perma.cc/4BZUXG3S].
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.134 Despite its rich history
as a pioneer in the gun industry, much of the company’s history has
been plagued by commercial crisis.135
In the 1970s and 1980s, Colt’s Manufacturing Company and other
American gun manufacturers began to lose large government contracts
to foreign gun makers. 136 In 1992, the company filed for bankruptcy
court protection. 137 In 1994, the company found a buyer in Donald
Zilkha, a wealthy Manhattan-based Iraqi banker from the family
investment firm Zilkha & Co., who purchased Colt for a mere $27
million. 138 Although Zilkha had hoped to help consolidate the market
and acquire some foreign gun producers, in the end, his efforts proved
futile.139 This was most evident when his hand-picked CEO made a set
of proposals that riled up Second Amendment activists, followed by the
failure of the company’s “smart gun.” 140 By 2002, a Greek banker at
Zilkha & Co., Ionnis Rigas, had started handling much of the oversight
of Colt’s Manufacturing Company.141 Rigas had formed his own firm,
Sciens Capital Management (“Sciens”), holding investment interests in
Athens and London, and saw an opportunity with Colt’s Manufacturing
Company.142 He arranged for a spinoff of the military business into what
is now known as Colt Defense.143
Sciens would put Colt Defense through “the private equity leverage
wringer,” loading the company with debt while receiving cash
distributions. 144 According to Bloomberg BusinessWeek, the following
were the highlights of the Colt Defense series of debt-financings:
The 2005 SEC filing shows payouts totaling $40 million over the
two prior years—a significant amount for a company in such fragile

134. Paul M. Barrett, Why Colt Can’t Shoot Straight, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(May 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-29/colts-curse-gunma
kers-owners-have-led-it-to-crisis-after-crisis [http://perma.cc/6FLR-CVAV].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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financial health. In 2006, another SEC filing shows, the company
redeemed “members’ equity” worth $41 million. In 2007, Colt
Defense agreed to borrow $150 million in a “leveraged
recapitalization” that featured distributions to “members” of $131
million. In 2009 it borrowed an additional $250 million, while
multimillion-dollar payouts continued. For 2010, Colt Defense had
sales of $176 million—more than double what they were in 2004—
145
but registered an $11 million loss.

These transactions elicited suspicion from people like Merrick
Alpert, an advisor and, later, senior vice president of Colt’s
Manufacturing Company, who said, “You didn’t have to work at Colt
Defense to know it had put itself in a dire situation.”146 Despite signs of
hope for increased revenues, Sciens’ attempt to turnaround Colt Defense
failed.147 The company had issued too much debt and, by 2014, it sought
an additional $4.1 million in liquidity from Morgan Stanley to make a
$10.9 million interest payment to bondholders in November.148 At this
point, it was clear that Colt Defense would be unable to meet its bond
obligations due in May 2015 without restructuring the debt. 149 The
company finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2015
in the wake of various accounting problems and the failure to complete
its annual SEC filing.150 Unlike the case in Hellas Communications, Colt

145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Andrew Schoulder & Robert Crowley, Analysis: Firearms Maker Colt a
Cautionary Tale for Defense Contractors, NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE (Dec. 15,
2014), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1699
[http://perma.cc/W4U4-G658] (“The subsequent transfer of Colt’s control to Sciens
Capital Management did not change much. Colt was saddled with leveraged
recapitalizations that left the company with $300 million of debt, at least $131 million
of which was used to make distributions back to Sciens in 2007.”).
148. Stephanie Gleason, Colt Warns It Could Miss May Bond Payment, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 26, 2014, 11:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gun-maker-colt-warns-onmissing-2015-targets-1417018925 [http://perma.cc/JV9V-47HC].
149. See Joy Ferguson, Colt Defense Warns It Might Miss May 2015 High Yield
Bond Payment, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/splev
erage/2014/11/26/colt-defense-warns-it-might-miss-may-2015-high-yield-bond-paymen
t/#1241cd4b3308 [http://perma.cc/GNB6-DYMZ].
150. Matt Jarzemsky, Colt Defense Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection,
WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2015, 8:12 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/colt-defense-tofile-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection-by-monday-1434310925 [http://perma.cc/BK
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Defense’s creditors included 2700 “mom and pop” bondholders who
represented about one quarter of the value of the bond debt. 151 This
further complicated Colt Defense’s efforts to reach a deal without filing
for bankruptcy.152
Unlike its earlier bankruptcy in the 1990s, however, Colt Defense
was able to escape a fire sale by successfully planning and exiting from
an accelerated chapter 11 restructuring.153 Showing signs of life by late
September 2015, the company was awarded a $212 million multi-year
contract with the U.S. Department of Defense. 154 On November 10,
2015, the company announced the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware’s approval of its disclosure statement for plan of
reorganization. 155 The plan received the support of Sciens and the
owners of more than 60% of Colt’s senior outstanding notes due in
2017. 156 In January 2016, the company successfully emerged from
restructuring.157

5M-X7RY]; Geoffrey Smith, Gun Maker Colt Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, FORTUNE (June 15, 2015, 6:03 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/15/coltgun-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection/ [http://perma.cc/3CR7-GVNN]. For documents,
court filings, and other information about the Colt Chapter 11 proceedings, visit
http://www.kccllc.net/coltdefense.
151. Jarzemsky, supra note 150.
152. Id.
153. Press Release, Colt, Colt Defense Emerges from Chapter 11 Restructuring Iconic American Brand Looks to Future with Stronger Capital Structure and Enhanced
Liquidity (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.colt.com/Media/Press-Releases/articleType/Articl
eView/articleId/141/COLT-DEFENSE-EMERGES-FROM-CHAPTER-11-RESTRUC
TURING—Iconic-American-Brand-Looks-to-Future-with-Stronger-Capital-Structureand-Enhanced-Liquidity [http://perma.cc/6FZE-DTA3].
154. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Release No: CR-184-15 (Sept. 25, 2015),
http://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/620608 [http://perma.c
c/2SD3-PSP6].
155. Colt Defense Announces Court Approval of Disclosure Statement for Plan of
Reorganization, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:53 PM), http://www.businesswire.co
m/news/home/20151110007074/en/Colt-Defense-Announces-Court-Approval-Disclosu
re-Statement [http://perma.cc/UB8A-38WL].
156. Anders Melin, Colt Defense, 179-Year-Old Gunmaker, Nears Exit From
Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2015-10-10/colt-defense-179-year-old-gunmaker-nears-exit-fro
m-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/XW8P-DRJZ].
157. Press Release, Colt, supra note 153.
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The case of Colt Defense is very unique from most private equity
leveraged portfolio companies. For one, Sciens had held its ownership
stake in Colt Defense for over fifteen years, and offered to buy out up to
$108 million in senior loans and $20 million in bankruptcy financing if
bondholders would accept a 55% haircut on their debt. 158 This was
perhaps Sciens’ most profitable move at the time for Colt Defense so as
to retain its investment.159 Had Sciens sold off Colt Defense following
its leveraged recapitalization in 2007, as Apax and TPG did in the case
of Hellas Communications, Colt Defense’s creditors would have likely
found themselves in the same situation as those of Hellas
Communications, with little opportunity for redress.160
C. MARKET TRENDS AMONG PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: HOW LEVERAGING
AFFECTS THE EXIT STRATEGY
As lower interest rates led to increased leverage among portfolio
companies similar to those described above, 161 they simultaneously
brought a sharp increase in the number and value of exits by the
investing firms. 162 2014 had a record $456 billion in buyout-backed
exits, and 2015 came in just under at $422 billion.163 This section briefly
addresses the exit trends that funds have used in recent years, including
IPOs, strategic secondary sales, and the leveraged recapitalization plans.
According to the Bain & Company Global Private Equity Report
for 2015, 2014 was “the year of the exit,”164 partially due to the rise in
158. Peg Brickley, Showdown Looms in Bankruptcy of Gun-Maker Colt Defense,
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/showdown-loomsin-bankruptcy-of-gun-maker-colt-defense-1434493099 [http://perma.cc/9FQA-GWFB];
Alexander Gladstone & Hema Oza, Colt Sponsor Sciens Locks and Loads Stalking
Horse Bid of Its Own, DEBTWIRE (June 11, 2015), http://www.debtwire.com/info/2015/
06/11/colt-sponsor-sciens-locks-loads-stalking-horse-bid/
[http://perma.cc/77EC64QU].
159. Barrett, supra note 134.
160. Conversely, had Hellas Communication’s managers opted not to sell the
company immediately following the redemption, the funds would not currently be the
subject of multiple law suits. See supra Part II.A.3.
161. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
162. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, supra note 34, at 20;
BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, supra note 34, at 4.
163. BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2016, supra note 34, at 20.
164. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, supra note 34, at iii.
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IPOs and strategic secondary sales.165 While many of these exits can be
explained by the global economy’s general recovery over the past few
years, 166 the increase can be explained, in part, by near-zero interest
rates.167 The increase in buyout-backed exits via IPOs and strategic sales
is due to the desire of managers to take advantage of rates while they are
low. 168 The United States expects to see a very slow path to rate
increases.169 When the rates rise, private equity investment will become
less appealing and more expensive.170 For now, private equity firms are
taking advantage of favorable valuations, and hope to free up capital,
and make further investments while the cost of borrowing is low.171 “A
slow rise in rates means sellers who cash out will still have good reason
to put their money back to work through acquisitions, since fixed
income investments will still offer low yields, and the equity market has
again shown it can swiftly transform into a sea of volatility.” 172
Additionally, interest rates affect the market for public offerings, and it
has been projected that the IPO market will slow as interest rates rise.173
Similarly, the market for strategic secondary sales is more appealing in

165.
166.

See id. at 3.
RR DONNELLEY, VENUE MARKET SPOTLIGHT: PRIVATE EQUITY EXITS 3
(2014), http://www.rrdonnelley.com/venue/media/November-VMS.pdf [http://perma.cc
/24VL-3FMC].
167. BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, supra note 34, at iii, 1–2.
168. See generally id.
169. David Harrison & Michael S. Derby, Janet Yellen Says Global Uncertainty
Justifies Slower Path of Rate Increases, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2016, 5:57 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-says-global-uncertainty-justifies-slower-path-ofrate-increases-1459268438 [http://perma.cc/S8M2-U5UB].
170. See William D. Cohan, Low Interest Rates Help Private-Equity Moguls and
Hurt Average Americans, THE NATION (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/artic
le/low-interest-rates-help-private-equity-moguls-and-hurt-average-americans/ [http://pe
rma.cc/NQW6-39DZ].
171. See generally BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015, supra note
34.
172. Matt Porzio, The Fed’s Interest Rate Decision: What It Means for M&A,
FORBES (Sept. 14, 2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mattporzio/2015/09/1
4/feds-interest-rate-decision-means-ma/ [http://perma.cc/K3YY-JEVY].
173. David J. Goldschmidt & Yasmeena F. Chaudry, US IPO Market Review and
Outlook: Can the Pace Continue?, SKADDEN (Jan. 2015), http://www.skadden.com/insi
ghts/us-ipo-market-review-and-outlook-can-pace-continue [http://perma.cc/F5M8-G5P
9].
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the face of low interest rates. 174 Corporate M&A remains one of the
most popular exit strategies for private equity and is expected to
continue to thrive as long as rates remain low.175
Lastly, the case of Hellas Communications shed a great deal of
negative light on a partial exit method—the leveraged recapitalization.176
Leveraged recapitalization is a strategy in which a company “takes on
significant additional debt with the purpose of either paying a large
dividend or repurchasing shares,” resulting in an overleveraged
company.177 The leveraged recapitalization by Apax and TPG in Hellas
Communications drew criticism because of the immediate sale after
overleveraging.178 That, however, is not the ideal situation in a leveraged
recapitalization; rather, a leveraged recapitalization works well where a
company’s growth rate is increasing and the owners are trying to obtain
some liquidity while maintaining the ownership position.179

174. Jeff Golman, Exit Strategy: Why Secondary Deals Are Becoming First Choice,
FORBES (May 20, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffgolman/2014/05/2
0/exit-strategy-why-secondary-deals-are-becoming-first-choice/#102b83d85fe0 [http://
perma.cc/RHC7-LQPJ] (“Record low interest rates have enabled companies, such as
private equity firms, to leverage transactions in a relatively inexpensive manner. PE
firms, as a result, have increased the amount of leverage used to finance the
transactions, allowing them to bid more aggressively than strategic buyers and offer a
higher purchase price.”).
175. Id.
176. See supra Part II.A.2-3. Colt served as an example of a more successful
recapitalization. See supra Part II.B; Barrett supra note 134.
177. Ian Giddy, Leveraged Recapitalizations and Exchange Offers, NYU STERN,
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/levrecap.htm [http://perma.cc/T8CS-XY4S].
178. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (describing the redemptions
and ensuing sale).
179. Anatomy of a Leveraged Recapitalization, MGM CAPITAL PARTNERS BLOG,
http://www.mcmcapital.com/mcm-docs/Anatomy_of_a_Leveraged_Capitalization.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N5RX-FLCE]. Perhaps in hope of avoiding these types of leveraged
recapitalizations and sell-offs, SEC Chair Mary Jo White announced in October 2015
that the Commission intends to develop private equity fund restructuring guidelines.
White, supra note 8. As of May 1, 2016, there had been no releases regarding such
guidance.
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III. WHAT TO DO ABOUT OVERLEVERAGING: DUTY TO ENSURE
COMPANY DEBTS ARE PAID
One option to deter private equity firms from overleveraging
portfolio companies would be to eliminate the tax-deductible interest
expense and raise taxes on carried interest.180 This proposal has been at
the forefront of various presidential candidates’ tax plans in the
upcoming 2016 election.181 However, this is an answer geared toward
limiting profit windfalls for private equity giants in leveraging
companies and appeasing the general public’s distrust of Wall Street,
rather than ensuring that debt in overleveraged portfolio companies will
be repaid. This Note instead advocates for a solution that enhances
fiduciary duties to ensure that a target company’s debts are paid by
parties already involved in the transactions via either the general partner
or the indenture trustee.182

180. See Toluse Olorunnipa & Angea Greiling Keane, Obama Renews Carried
Interest Tax Fight with Republican Help, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Sept. 16, 2015, 3:57
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-16/obama-dusts-off-carriedinterest-tax-fight-with-republican-help [http://perma.cc/8EXV-2G26].
181. See Barney Jopson, Trump and Clinton Tax Plans Scare Wall Street, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016, 6:40 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d8d4fec-bae0-11e5b151-8e15c9a029fb.html [http://perma.cc/4Y78-68L2]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, The
Surprising Target of Jeb Bush’s Tax Plan: Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/business/dealbook/jeb-bushs-tax-plan-is-brimmin
g-with-surprises.html [http://perma.cc/YSJ7-9UYR].
182. Additionally, while not a viable solution on its own, it should be noted that this
type of asset stripping behavior exhibited in the case of Hellas Communications could
be lessened with increased due diligence by creditors when contracting with private
equity firms. This was overlooked in that case. Despite being sophisticated investors
who purchased Hellas Communications notes, the creditors relied on faulty valuations
provided by Ernst & Young. Complaint at 43, Hosking v. TPG Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In
re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA) (Hosking II), 535 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2015); see EY Hit with UK Fine over Greek Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES (June 16, 2015),
http://www.ft.com/fastft/2015/06/16/ey-hit-with-fine-uk-over-greek-bankruptcy/ [http://
perma.cc/TB58-388U]. Although eventually sanctioned, Ernst & Young was certainly
partially responsible for the creditors continued struggle to recover their investments.
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A. INTRODUCING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
As previously discussed, Delaware law favors the freedom to
contract around fiduciary duties in the LP and LLC setting.183 In recent
years, Delaware courts have created ambiguity over whether the
managers of LLCs may also have default fiduciary duties to the
company, leaving the legislature ample opportunity to address this
issue.184 However, the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to address the
issue.185 Given the similar nature of LLCs and LPs, and the similarities
between the applicable provisions for fiduciary duties in the Delaware
Code,186 LP fiduciary duties deserve an equal look here. It is important
to note that while a person serving on the board of a portfolio company
has a duty to the private equity fund employer, there is no reciprocal
duty for the general partner to the portfolio company. 187 Rather, the
general partner only has limited fiduciary duties of care and loyalty with
respect to the limited partners, and generally must maximize the return
on their investment.188 Sometimes these duties supersede the long-term
interests of the portfolio company, such as obligations to long-term
creditors as evidenced in Hellas Communications.
By creating such a fiduciary duty, general partners would not be
able to issue debt from the LP and then redeem their own securities, as
such a redemption would certainly constitute a breach of fiduciary duty
by Delaware corporate law standards. 189 While extending fiduciary
183.
184.

See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849–856 (Del. Ch.
2012). In Auriga, Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Leo E. Strine, Jr. based his opinion, in
part, on a provision in the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act that states, “In any
case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (2016). The Delaware Revised Limited Partnership Act has
an identical provision. Id. § 17-1105.
185. Matthew M. Greenberg et al., Private Equity Fund Considerations in Light of
Delaware’s LLC Debate, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.pepperla
w.com/publications/private-equity-fund-considerations-in-light-of-delawares-llc-debate
-2013-02-25/ [http://perma.cc/XZW8-BEWQ].
186. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1105, 18-1104.
187. McDonald, supra note 16.
188. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
189. See, e.g., Agway Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Burkeholder (In re Agway, Inc.), No.
04-80269, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4552, at *42–43 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (citing
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 Del. Ch. 1997) (“Whether or not a transaction
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duties to an LP may be an unfavorable idea, 190 it is hardly an
unreasonable response.
B. EXPANDING THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE’S DUTIES AND POWERS
Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “TIA”), prior to a
default, the duties of an indenture trustee are ministerial and narrow,
limited to “such duties as are specifically set out in [the] indenture.”191
The TIA underutilizes the indenture trustee, who is in a unique position
to oversee that debt issuances are not made in vain, or without a chance
for repayment. Rather, the indenture trustee should be positioned as
what has previously been coined a “supertrustee” with “extensive
monitoring rights” that include monitoring compliance with the bond
indenture.192 Thus, where an issuer engages in behavior that makes it
clear that there will be no payment of principal and interest, the trustee
would have a duty to take action against the issuer on behalf of the
noteholder beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION
As evidenced, overleveraging in private equity is not always a
problem, but can become one when fund managers engage in behavior
that strips a portfolio company of its assets. Something must be done to
deter this type of behavior. With interest rates remaining at near floor
levels, private equity is expected to see continued growth in the
upcoming years, and accordingly, without a change, the same trends in
portfolio bankruptcies and overleveraging that come alongside a boom
in private equity activity will likely continue. While 2017 is expected to
bring about that change through tax code reform,193 more is certainly
needed to counteract certain devastating results that may occur with
overleveraging, as seen in the case of Hellas Communications. Although
constitutes corporate waste depends on whether the transfers or payments in connection
with the redemptions served no corporate purpose or were for no consideration.”).
190. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2007).
191. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (2012).
192. Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51
STAN. L. REV. 447, 470 (1999).
193. See Olorunnipa & Keane, supra note 180.
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the courts have started to realize that private equity funds should be held
accountable for company debts through the application of fraudulent
transfer law and where ERISA assets are managed, there is more work
to be done. Creditors of private equity investments should have a
mechanism in place so as to avoid spending years in bankruptcy court
with a private equity giant settling debts with creditors. The proposals
outlined in this Note are such a mechanism that should be considered.

